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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
American Express Travel Related Services (“Amex”) 
challenges the constitutionality of 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25 
(“Chapter 25”), which amended New Jersey’s unclaimed 
property statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B (2002), and 
retroactively reduced the period after which travelers checks 
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are presumed abandoned from fifteen years to three years.1
I.  Background and Procedural History 
  
Amex filed a motion for preliminary injunction against New 
Jersey Treasurer Andrew P. Sidamon-Eristoff (“Treasurer”) 
and New Jersey Unclaimed Property Administrator Steven R. 
Harris (collectively, “New Jersey” or “State”) in the District 
Court on the grounds that Chapter 25’s provision reducing the 
abandonment period for travelers checks violates the Due 
Process Clause, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and 
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  The 
District Court denied Amex’s motion, holding that Amex 
failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its 
claims.  Amex filed a timely appeal.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 Amex Travelers Cheques (“TCs”)2
                                              
1 This opinion addresses the challenge brought against 
2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25 (“Chapter 25”) with respect to 
travelers checks.  We discuss the appeal filed by New Jersey 
Retail Merchants Association, New Jersey Food Council, and 
American Express Prepaid Card Management Corporation, 
seeking to enjoin Chapter 25 with respect to stored value 
cards (“SVCs”), in a separate opinion. 
 are preprinted 
checks for amounts ranging from $20 to $100.  Each one is 
identifiable based on a unique serial number.  Amex 
maintains that the TCs never expire, so they are contractually 
obligated to honor the TCs once they are issued.  Amex sells 
TCs for the face value amount, normally through a third party 
2 We use “TCs” to refer to Amex Travelers Cheques 
specifically, as opposed to travelers checks generally. 
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bank or travel service.  The third party can charge a small fee, 
which it retains, but Amex does not charge a fee beyond the 
face value of the TCs.  Amex claims that it can sell TCs 
without charging a fee because its contractual relationship 
with TC owners gives Amex the right to retain, use, and 
invest funds from the sale of TCs from the date of sale until 
the date the TCs are cashed or used.  Amex asserts that this 
right to invest the funds is integral to the contract between TC 
owners and Amex, and that it relies on these invested funds to 
remain profitable in the TC business. 
When a TC is sold, the third party seller transmits the 
funds to Amex and provides Amex with the TC’s serial 
number, its amount, and the date and place of sale.  
Generally, the seller does not provide the purchaser’s name, 
address, or any other identifying information.  When Amex 
sells TCs directly to consumers, it retains only the same 
information that it receives from third party sellers. 
 All fifty states, and the District of Columbia, have a set 
of unclaimed property laws (often called escheat laws), most 
of which are based on a version of the Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act (“UUPA”).  These laws require that once 
property has been deemed abandoned, the holder turn it over 
to the state while the original property owner still maintains 
the right to the property.  The purpose of unclaimed property 
laws is to provide for the safekeeping of abandoned property 
and then to reunite the abandoned property with its owner.  
Usually, before turning over abandoned property to the state, 
the holder must attempt to return the property by contacting 
the owner, using the owner’s name and last known address.  
If the holder is unable to return the property to the owner and 
turns it over to the state, the holder provides the state with the 
name and last known address of the owner.  The holder is no 
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longer liable to the property owner once it turns over the 
property to the state.  The state then makes an effort to reunite 
the owner with the property.  Under New Jersey’s custodial 
escheat statute, the rightful owner may file a claim to recover 
the property at any time after the property is turned over to 
the State. 
 However, travelers checks operate differently because 
issuers like Amex generally do not obtain the names or 
addresses of the purchasers.  Thus, the requirement that 
holders send notice to the owner at the last known address 
before turning over such property to the State does not apply 
to travelers checks.  Travelers check issuers are also 
exempted from the requirement to include the owner’s name 
and last known address on unclaimed property reports.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-47 (2002).  Amex sends only the serial 
number, amount, and date of sale when TCs are sent to the 
State as unclaimed property.  If Amex determines that a 
cashed TC has a serial number indicating that it has been paid 
to a state as unclaimed property, Amex seeks to reclaim those 
funds from that state.  In New Jersey, when such claims are 
filed, the Treasurer returns the funds with interest. 
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 Until recently, all fifty states had a fifteen-year 
abandonment period for travelers checks.3
 On September 23, 2010, Amex filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
alleging that Chapter 25 violated the Due Process Clause, the 
Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution.  Amex also filed a motion for 
  But on June 24, 
2010, the New Jersey Legislature passed Chapter 25, which 
shortened the abandonment period for travelers checks from 
fifteen years to three years.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-11 
(2010).  The purpose of the statute was to “protect New 
Jersey consumers from certain commercial dormancy fee 
practices and to modernize New Jersey’s unclaimed property 
laws.”  State of N.J. Assemb. Budget Comm., Statement to 
Assembly, No. 3002, 214th Leg., at 1 (June 24, 2010).  Under 
the State’s unclaimed property law, after an issuer transfers 
the presumed abandoned property to the State, the property is 
then administered through New Jersey’s unclaimed property 
system.  The State preserves the property in perpetuity for the 
owner, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-9 (2002), or for another state 
that can prove a superior right of escheat.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 46:30B-81 (2002). 
                                              
3 Recently, Kentucky also shortened its abandonment 
period for travelers checks from fifteen years to seven years.  
Although Amex successfully challenged Kentucky’s statute 
in federal district court on substantive due process grounds, 
Am. Express Travel Related Serv. v. Kentucky, 597 F. Supp. 
2d 717 (E.D. Ky. 2009), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the 
statute withstood rational basis scrutiny.  Am. Express Travel 
Related Servs. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the State from 
enforcing Chapter 25.  On November 13, 2010, the District 
Court denied Amex’s motion for preliminary injunction with 
respect to travelers checks.  Amex filed a timely appeal. 
II.  Standard of Review 
 “We generally review a district court’s [grant or] 
denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion[,] 
but review the underlying factual findings for clear error and 
examine legal conclusions de novo.”  Brown v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted).  “We have jurisdiction to review the order [granting 
or] denying a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1).”  Id. at 268 n.6. 
III.  Discussion 
A court must consider four factors when ruling on a 
motion for preliminary injunction:  “(1) whether the movant 
has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; 
(2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial 
of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will 
result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 
(4) whether granting preliminary relief will be in the public 
interest.”  Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t Inc., 239 F.3d 
357, 364 (3d Cir. 2001).  The moving party’s failure to show 
a likelihood of success on the merits “must necessarily result 
in the denial of a preliminary injunction.”  In re Arthur 
Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 
1982).  We evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits of 
Amex’s four constitutional claims accordingly. 
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 A. Substantive Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. 
Amend. XIV, § 1.  It is well established that the Due Process 
Clause contains both a procedural and substantive 
component.  Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992)).  Substantive due 
process contains two lines of inquiry: one that applies when a 
party challenges the validity of a legislative act, and one that 
applies to the challenge of a non-legislative action.  Id.  In a 
case challenging a legislative act, as here, the act must 
withstand rational basis review.  Id.  To do so, the defendant 
must demonstrate (1) the existence of a legitimate state 
interest that (2) could be rationally furthered by the statute.  
Id. (citation omitted).  The rational basis test, although “not a 
toothless one,” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976), 
requires significant deference to the legislature’s decision-
making and assumptions.  Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1995).  “[T]hose attacking 
the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 
‘to negative every conceivable basis which might support 
it[.]’”  FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 
(1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 
410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
 Amex argues that the sole purpose behind enacting 
Chapter 25 was to raise revenue for the State, which is not a 
legitimate state interest.  But under rational basis scrutiny, a 
court’s inquiry is limited to whether the law “rationally 
furthers any legitimate state objective.”  Malmed v. 
Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis 
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added).  It is enough that the State offers a conceivable 
rational basis for its action, and “[t]he court may even 
hypothesize the motivations of the state legislature to find a 
legitimate objective promoted by the provision under attack.”  
Id. (citation omitted).  It is “constitutionally irrelevant 
whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative 
decision . . . .”  Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960). 
The State submits that Chapter 25 was enacted to 
modernize the State’s unclaimed property laws by making the 
abandonment period for travelers checks more consistent with 
that of other property.  The State also argues that Chapter 25 
provides greater protection for property owners.  They reason 
that shortening the abandonment period will facilitate the 
transfer of the property from a private company to the State at 
an earlier time; this would provide greater protection for 
property owners because private companies are subject to 
greater economic instability compared to a perpetually 
solvent government entity.  In general, taking custody of 
abandoned property is a legitimate state interest.  See 
Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 497 (1993) (“States as 
sovereigns may take custody of or assume title to abandoned 
personal property. . . .”).  We agree that, as a corollary, the 
State has a legitimate interest in protecting its property 
owners and modernizing its unclaimed property laws to 
promote consistency.  Accordingly, we reject Amex’s 
contention that Chapter 25 lacks a legitimate state interest. 
Amex contests that even if there are legitimate state 
interests, Chapter 25 fails to rationally further these goals.  
Because Amex has the burden of rebutting every conceivable 
rational basis, see Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315, we 
examine each of Amex’s arguments in turn. 
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 Amex first argues that shortening the abandonment 
period has no rational relationship to increasing property 
protection because 90% of travelers checks not used after 
three years are used within fifteen years.  Thus, Amex 
contends, it is irrational to conclude that travelers checks can 
be presumed abandoned after three years.  But the statistics 
also show that over 96% of all travelers checks are redeemed 
within three years.  Decl. of Susan Helms at 3, Am. Express 
Travel Related Servs., 755 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D. N.J. 2010) 
(No. 10-4328).  Even if Amex disagrees with the State 
Legislature’s presumption that travelers checks unredeemed 
after three years are abandoned, the rational basis test does 
not require mathematical precision in the legislature’s 
decisions.  See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).  
“[L]egislative choice . . . may be based on rational 
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”  
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315.  Thus, Amex’s argument 
is insufficient to overcome rational basis scrutiny. 
Amex next argues that shortening the abandonment 
period for travelers checks does not further Chapter 25’s 
stated purpose of modernizing the State’s unclaimed property 
laws.  But the State has a conceivable legitimate interest in 
making its unclaimed property laws more consistent for ease 
of administration.  Chapter 25 accomplishes this by making 
the abandonment period for travelers checks the same as 
checks, drafts, and other similar negotiable instruments.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-16 (2002).  Amex responds that 
unclaimed property laws require establishing different time 
periods based upon the nature of the property, so consistency 
is not a rational basis for selecting an abandonment period.  
But state laws cannot be invalidated based on mere policy 
disagreements.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (holding that 
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under rational basis scrutiny, courts are not free to invalidate 
state law because they disagree with the underlying policy 
decisions).  Because modernizing unclaimed property laws 
through consistent abandonment periods is a conceivable 
rational basis for enacting Chapter 25, Amex fails to 
overcome rational basis scrutiny.4
 In addition, the State Legislature could have rationally 
believed that the shorter abandonment period better protected 
customers by giving custody of the property to the State at an 
earlier time.  Conceivably, there are benefits to having 
property safeguarded by a perpetually-solvent sovereign 
instead of a private entity with a greater risk of insolvency.  In 
addition, the State can hold the travelers check funds in 
perpetuity and must invest unclaimed property funds more 
conservatively than Amex is required to invest its TC funds.  
Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:15C-2 (2000) (permitting 
investment in “any investment which is rated in one of the 
three highest rating categories by a nationally recognized 
statistical rating organization”) with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-
75 (2000) (restricting investments of funds of Unclaimed 
Property Trust Fund to government bonds or interest-bearing 
notes or obligations).  The State has offered several legitimate 
interests that justify shortening the abandonment period for 
travelers checks from fifteen years to three years.  Chapter 25 
 
                                              
4 Amex also contends that changing the abandonment 
period does not rationally further the statute’s purpose of 
reuniting property with its owners because the State does not 
have the names and addresses of travelers check purchasers.  
But, as discussed above, changing the abandonment period 
conceivably furthers other rational bases, which is sufficient 
for Chapter 25 to survive rational basis scrutiny. 
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rationally furthers these interests, and Amex does not meet its 
burden of defeating every conceivable basis that might 
support Chapter 25’s enactment.  See Beach Commc’ns, 508 
U.S. at 315.  Therefore, Amex fails to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its substantive due process claim. 
 B. Contract Clause 
The Contract Clause under Article I, Section 10, 
Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State 
shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”  To ascertain whether there has been a Contract 
Clause violation, a court must first inquire whether the 
change in State law has “operated as a substantial impairment 
of a contractual relationship.”  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 
503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (citations omitted); Nieves v. Hess 
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(citations omitted).  If this threshold inquiry is met, the court 
must then determine “whether the law at issue has a 
legitimate and important public purpose.”  Transport Workers 
Union of Am., Local 290 v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 145 F.3d 
619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998).  If so, the court must ascertain 
“whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the 
contractual relationship was reasonable and appropriate in 
light of that purpose.”  Id.  Where the contract is between 
private parties, courts may “defer to legislative judgment as to 
the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.”  
U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977).  
But this review of legislative judgment is more exacting than 
the rational basis standard applied in the due process analysis.  
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 
717, 733 (1984). 
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 Amex fails to show that Chapter 25 imposes a 
substantial impairment on Amex’s contractual relationships 
with TC owners.  While Amex has the right to use and invest 
TC funds until the date the TC is cashed or sold, the duration 
of use is further subject to the lawful abandonment period set 
by unclaimed property laws.  The Supreme Court has long 
established that 
the contract of deposit does not give the banks a 
tontine right to retain the money in the event 
that it is not called for by the depositor.  It gives 
the bank merely the right to use the depositor’s 
money until called for by him or some other 
person duly authorized.  If the deposit is turned 
over to the state in obedience to a valid law, the 
obligation of the bank to the depositor is 
discharged. 
Sec. Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 286 (1923) 
(citation omitted).  In Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, the 
Supreme Court again stated that “[s]ince the bank is a debtor 
to its depositors, it can interpose no due process or contract 
clause objection to payment of the claimed deposits to the 
state, if the state is lawfully entitled to demand payment . . . .”  
321 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1944) (citation omitted).  Like banks, 
Amex, as a debtor to the TC purchasers, only has the right to 
use the funds received from issuing a TC until either the 
owner or the State, under a valid law, claims the funds.  
Accordingly, a state’s ability to claim abandoned property in 
the travelers check context does not ordinarily substantially 
impair travelers check issuers’ contractual relationships or 
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otherwise violate the Contract Clause.5
In assessing substantial impairment under the Contract 
Clause, we look to “the legitimate expectations of the 
contracting parties,” U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 19 
n.17 (1977), and whether the modification imposes an 
obligation or liability that was unexpected at the time the 
parties entered into the contract and relied on its terms.  See 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247 
(1978).  An important factor in determining the substantiality 
of any contractual impairment is whether the parties were 
operating in a regulated industry.  See Energy Reserves Grp., 
Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 
(1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 242 
n.13).  When a party enters an industry that is regulated in a 
particular manner, it is entering subject to further legislation 
in the area, and changes in the regulation that may affect its 
contractual relationships are foreseeable.  See id.  New Jersey 
has consistently regulated travelers checks, both generally 
under the Money Transmitter Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:15C 
(2000), and as abandoned property under the unclaimed 
property statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:30B-11 (2010).  Given 
such consistent regulation, Chapter 25’s amendment of the 
abandonment period did not upset Amex’s legitimate 
  See Sec. Sav. Bank, 
263 U.S. at 285-86. 
                                              
5 This analysis differs from the analysis with respect to 
issuers of SVCs because, unlike travelers checks or bank 
deposits, SVCs are not redeemable for cash.  Thus, the 
relationship between SVC purchasers and their issuers is 
distinguishable from the relationship between depositors and 
banks, which are required to turn over the value of the deposit 
in cash upon the depositor’s demand. 
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expectations as the contracting party or impose an unexpected 
change in its contractual obligations.  U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 
19 n.17 (stating “a reasonable modification of statutes . . . is 
much less likely to upset expectations than a law adjusting the 
express terms of an agreement”). 
Amex next claims that the fifteen-year abandonment 
period was an implied term of the contract for TCs that were 
sold prior to the enactment of Chapter 25.  It is true that the 
terms of a contract often include the state law relating to the 
contract.  See Farmers & Merchs. Bank of Monroe v. Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, 262 U.S. 649, 660 (1923).  But 
not all “state regulations are implied terms of every contract 
entered into while they are effective, especially when the 
regulations themselves cannot be fairly interpreted to require 
such incorporation.”  Gen. Motors, 503 U.S. at 189.  And 
“state laws are implied into private contracts regardless of the 
assent of the parties only when those laws affect the validity, 
construction, and enforcement of contracts.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Critically, the adjustment of the abandonment 
period merely shortens the time during which Amex can 
invest the TC funds, without affecting the validity, 
construction, and enforcement of the contract between Amex 
and its customers.  Amex also fails to show how New Jersey 
law pertaining to unclaimed property can be interpreted to 
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require incorporation into Amex’s contract with its customer.6
 C. Takings Clause 
  
Because Amex has not shown that Chapter 25 constitutes a 
substantial impairment on this contractual relationship, it did 
not succeed in showing a likelihood of success on its Contract 
Clause claim. 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
the federal government from taking private property for 
public use without providing just compensation. U.S. Const. 
Amend. V.  The Takings Clause applies to state action 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980) 
(citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
239 (1897) and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 122 (1978)).  When a state directly appropriates 
private property, it is considered a per se taking, and the state 
has a duty to compensate the owner.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
                                              
6 Amex’s reliance on Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Is. 
Corp., 819 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1987) is misplaced.  In Nieves, 
a 1986 amendment to the Virgin Island’s Workmen’s 
Compensation Act retroactively eliminated an employer’s 
immunity from tort actions.  819 F.2d at 1248.  Because the 
employer had immunity under the law at the time of the 
contract, this amendment exposed the employer to significant 
additional tort liability that was unexpected.  Id.  Chapter 25, 
however, does not impose an unexpected liability on Amex 
that would “completely destroy[] its contractual 
expectations.”  Id. at 1248.  It only seeks to retroactively 
claim abandoned travelers checks that ultimately belong to 
the purchasers, not Amex. 
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Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 
(2002).  Where, as here, a party asserts a regulatory taking, 
there is no set formula.  Rather, courts must engage in a 
factual inquiry to determine whether a taking has been 
effected.  New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 468 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1015 (1992)). 
To succeed on a takings claim, Amex must show that 
the State’s action affected a “legally cognizable property 
interest.”  Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 
428 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) and Webb’s, 449 U.S. 
at 160-61 (1980)).  “Relevant considerations include ‘[t]he 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and . . . the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations.’”  New Jersey v. United 
States, 91 F.3d at 463 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). 
The character of the state action is also relevant:  
unlike “a physical invasion of land[,] . . . a public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good . . . ordinarily will not be 
compensable.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Thus, that a regulation “adversely affect[s] 
recognized economic values” is not enough to constitute a 
taking.  Id.  Even a regulation that prohibits the most 
beneficial use of property, or prevents an individual from 
operating an otherwise lawful business, does not necessarily 
violate the Takings Clause.  Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125-26. 
We agree with the District Court that Amex failed to 
show a likelihood of success on the merits of its takings 
claim.  Amex maintains that it has both a right to invest the 
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proceeds from the sale of TCs and a property interest in the 
income generated.  Amex argues that the retroactive 
application of Chapter 25 constitutes a taking because it 
interferes with Amex’s investment-backed expectation that 
TCs already sold would have an abandonment period of 
fifteen years, which would have allowed Amex to invest the 
proceeds for fifteen years unless the owner redeemed the 
check.7
Lastly, the fact that Amex has a contractual right to 
invest TC funds does not necessarily render Chapter 25 an 
  However, Amex’s claim that Chapter 25 interferes 
with its investment-backed expectations cannot stand because 
Amex’s TC business has long been subject to regulation by 
New Jersey.  The Supreme Court has established that 
“‘[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object 
if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent 
amendments to achieve the legislative end.’”  Connolly v. 
Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (quoting 
FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).  Since 
Chapter 25 is a subsequent amendment to achieve the 
legislative end of assuming custody of abandoned property, 
Amex has no ground to claim interference with its 
investment-backed expectations. 
                                              
7 Contrary to Amex’s contention, E. Enterp. v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 498 (1998), is distinguishable from this case.  In E. 
Enterp., the Supreme Court held that the Coal Industry 
Retiree Health Benefit Act was an unconstitutional taking 
because it imposed on the employer retroactive pension 
liability for retired miners.  Id. at 532.  But here, Chapter 25 
does not impose any further liability on Amex.  It only 
requires that issuers like Amex turn over property owned by 
the travelers check owners to State custody. 
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unconstitutional taking.  The State has considerable authority 
to enact legislation, including “the power to affect contractual 
commitments between private parties.”  See E. Enterp., 524 
U.S. 498, 528 (1998).  Amex’s ability to utilize TC funds is 
constrained by the owner’s ability to redeem a TC on demand 
and by the terms of the State’s unclaimed property laws.  See 
Security Sav. Bank, 263 U.S. at 286.  In Delaware v. New 
York, the Supreme Court delineated the property right of 
debtors with regard to state escheat laws: 
Funds held by a debtor become subject to 
escheat because the debtor has no interest in the 
funds – precisely the opposite of having “a 
claim to the funds as an asset.” We have 
recognized as much in cases upholding a State’s 
power to escheat neglected bank deposits.  
Charters, bylaws, and contracts of deposit do 
not give a bank the right to retain abandoned 
deposits, and a law requiring the delivery of 
such deposits to the State affects no property 
interest belonging to the bank.  [Sec. Sav. Bank, 
263 U.S. at 285-86]; Provident Institution for 
Sav. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1911).  
Thus, “deposits are debtor obligations of the 
bank,” and a State may “protect the interests of 
depositors” as creditors by assuming custody 
over accounts “inactive so long as to be 
presumptively abandoned.”  [Anderson Nat. 
Bank, 321 U.S. at 241] (emphasis added).  Such 
“disposition of abandoned property is a function 
of the state,” a sovereign “exercise of a 
regulatory power” over property and the private 
legal obligations inherent in property.  
 
20 
[Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 
436 (1951)]. 
507 U.S. 490, 502 (1993).  Thus, Amex, as debtor to TC 
owners, has no right to retain the funds once they are deemed 
abandoned under the State’s unclaimed property laws.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in finding that 
Amex failed to show a reasonable probability of success on 
its Takings Clause claim. 
 D. Commerce Clause 
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power 
to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”  U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  “This clause also has an implied 
requirement (often called the ‘negative’ or ‘dormant’ aspect 
of the clause) that the states not ‘mandate differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that 
benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”  Cloverland-
Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 
249, 261 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Granholm v. Heald, 533 U.S. 
460, 472 (2005)).  Our inquiry as to whether a state law 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause is twofold: first, we 
determine whether heightened scrutiny applies, and, if not, 
then we determine whether the law is invalid under the Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), balancing test.  
Cloverland-Green, 462 F.3d at 261 (citation omitted).  We 
apply heightened scrutiny when a law “discriminates against 
interstate commerce” in purpose or effect.  C & A Carbone, 
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).  
Because Amex has not alleged that heightened scrutiny 
applies, we look to the Pike balancing test.  Under this test, 
courts will uphold nondiscriminatory regulations that only 
incidentally affect interstate commerce unless “the burden 
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imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
Amex contends that Chapter 25, if implemented, will 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because its effects will 
be projected into other states.  Specifically, Amex claims that 
it will be forced to choose between:  (a) selling TCs in New 
Jersey at a marginal profit or at a loss; (b) not selling TCs in 
New Jersey; (c) charging a fee for selling TCs in New Jersey; 
or (d) charging a fee to sell TCs throughout the country so 
that it can maintain uniform conditions.  If it chooses to 
charge a fee to sell TCs throughout the country, Amex argues, 
then Chapter 25 will have dictated commercial activity in 
other states. 
Amex compares such a result to laws the Supreme 
Court struck down on dormant Commerce Clause grounds in 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986) and Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 
491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).  In Brown-Forman, the Supreme 
Court found that New York had “project[ed] its legislation 
into [other States]” by requiring distillers to seek the approval 
of the New York State Liquor Authority before lowering 
prices in other states.  476 U.S. 583-84 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted) (second alteration in original).  
Similarly, in Healy, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Connecticut statute that “require[d] out-of-state shippers of 
beer to affirm that their posted prices for products sold to 
Connecticut wholesalers [were] . . . no higher than the prices 
at which those products are sold in [neighboring states.]”  491 
U.S. at 326.  The Court held both statutes to be 
unconstitutional because “States may not deprive businesses 
and consumers in other States of ‘whatever competitive 
advantages they may possess based on the conditions of the 
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local market.”  Healy, 491 U.S. at 339 (quoting Brown-
Forman, 476 U.S. at 580). 
Unlike these statutes, Chapter 25 does not directly 
regulate travelers checks sold in other states or force Amex to 
conform its out-of-state practices to less favorable in-state 
conditions.  Nothing prevents other states from regulating 
travelers checks differently from the way New Jersey has 
chosen to do in Chapter 25.  And by Amex’s own admission, 
the costs of compliance could be passed on to New Jersey 
travelers check customers or be absorbed by issuers like 
Amex.8
                                              
8 Amex argues that requiring it to change its TC 
business so that it operates differently in New Jersey than it 
does in other jurisdictions (e.g., charging a fee in New Jersey) 
would substantially burden interstate commerce based on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 
Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).  But the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that Bibb was an exceptional case because the 
state law obstructed the literal movement of goods between 
states by requiring trucks to alter their safety equipment upon 
entering Illinois.  Id. at 529.  The Court maintained that states 
have “great leeway in providing safety regulations for all 
vehicles—interstate as well as local[,]” but in that case, the 
burden on the interstate movement of trucks passed “the 
permissible limits even for safety regulations.”  Id. at 530.  
Amex has not shown that Chapter 25 imposes a similarly 
heavy burden for this to be considered an exceptional case. 
  Under the Pike balancing test, when the costs of a 
regulation may be born solely by those in the state enacting it, 
the burden imposed on interstate commerce is minimal, and 
not excessive in relation to the putative local benefits 
articulated by the State.  See United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. 
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Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
345 (2007) (holding when “the very people who voted for the 
laws” bear the costs attributable to those laws, the costs of the 
regulation do not fall outside the state).  Therefore, Amex 
failed to show a reasonable probability of success on the 
merits of its Commerce Clause claim. 
 E. Remaining preliminary injunction factors 
 Because Amex was unable to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its claims, we need not address the 
remaining preliminary injunction factors, see Crissman, 239 
F.3d at 364 (listing preliminary injunction factors), and the 
District Court’s denial of Amex’s motion for preliminary 
injunction must be affirmed.  See In re Arthur Treacher’s 
Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d at 1143. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 We hold that Amex failed to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its Due Process Clause, Contract 
Clause, Takings Clause, and Commerce Clause claims.  Thus, 
the motion for preliminary injunction of Chapter 25 must be 
denied.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
